

Civil-Military Cooperation within the Total People's War Strategy in Dealing with the Communal Unrest in Poso in 2000-2001 to Achieve the Peace Resolution

Hasrul Prasetyo L*, Buddy Suseto, Frega Ferdinand Wenas Inkiriwang, Muhamad Noor Gibran

Universitas Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, Indonesia
Email: hasrul.lagandi@gmail.com*, Gibsabd@gmail.com

Keywords:

civil–military cooperation;
CIMIC; total people's war
strategy; sishankamrata; poso
conflict; peace resolution;

Abstract

The 2000–2001 Poso communal conflict constituted a complex security challenge involving religious tensions, political competition, social fragmentation, and widespread violence that could not be addressed through military or law enforcement measures alone. This study examined the implementation of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) among military forces, government institutions, and civilian stakeholders; its reflection of Indonesia's Total People's Defense and Security System (Sishankamrata); and its contribution to peacebuilding and conflict resolution. A qualitative single-case study design was employed using semi-structured interviews with five purposively selected informants and document analysis of defense policies, peace agreements, and organizational reports. The data were analyzed using the interactive model developed by Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña. The findings indicated that CIMIC was implemented through security stabilization, interagency coordination, communication and information sharing, community engagement, civilian protection, humanitarian assistance, dialogue, mediation, post-conflict recovery, and reconciliation. However, implementation remained uneven because of institutional friction and the limited institutionalization of civilian participation. CIMIC reflected key principles of Sishankamrata, particularly the integration of military and nonmilitary components, the mobilization of national resources, and societal participation, although these principles were not comprehensively institutionalized. CIMIC contributed to conflict resolution by establishing security conditions conducive to dialogue, supporting confidence-building measures, facilitating mediation, and linking security stabilization with recovery and reconciliation. The study concluded that CIMIC functioned as a strategic bridge between security management and peacebuilding, demonstrating that sustainable peace requires integrated cooperation among military institutions, government authorities, and civil society. These findings provide strategic insights for strengthening interagency coordination and developing more adaptive and participatory models of civil-military cooperation.

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's post-Reformasi decentralization was intended to transform the country's ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity into a source of national stability, with mechanisms such as peace agreements and institutional consolidation expected to help resolve intergroup conflict (Center, 2010; Van Klinken, 2007). This aspiration was repeatedly tested as Indonesia experienced major communal conflicts in Ambon, Poso, Sampit, and other regions following

the fall of the New Order, demonstrating that domestic instability could threaten national integrity as seriously as external military aggression (Bertrand, 2004).

Poso Regency became the site of one of the bloodiest sectarian communal conflicts in modern Indonesian history between 1998 and 2001 (Sidel, 2006). What began as small-scale local political tensions in late 1998 rapidly escalated into large-scale religiously framed violence, fueled by slow and fragmented early security responses and the involvement of external actors who exploited local disputes (Diprose, 2009; McRae, 2013). The conflict was rooted in a complex interplay of demographic change, economic competition between Indigenous Christian communities and Muslim migrants, political rivalry following decentralization, and religious identity polarization. According to World Bank and UNSFIR data, the conflict killed an estimated 1,000–1,200 people, displaced approximately 100,000 residents nearly one-third of Poso's population and destroyed more than 15,000 homes, as well as numerous places of worship, schools, and public facilities, thereby paralyzing the local economy and reinforcing religiously based spatial segregation (Bank/UNSFIR, 2004).

The Malino I Declaration, signed on 19–20 December 2001 through Indonesian government mediation led by Coordinating Minister Jusuf Kalla, brought large-scale open violence to an end through ten formal points of agreement addressing the cessation of conflict, law enforcement, refugee repatriation, property restoration, and economic rehabilitation. The declaration, signed by twenty-four Christian and twenty-five Muslim delegates, also established two joint commissions dealing with security and socioeconomic affairs. However, implementation gaps including incomplete disarmament, slow economic recovery, and weak law enforcement against key perpetrators left unresolved grievances (Center, 2010)). Rather than disappearing entirely, violence in Poso changed in character after 2001, shifting from open communal conflict to sporadic militant and terrorist activity and eventually contributing to the emergence of groups such as Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), which used Poso's mountainous terrain as a base for training and guerrilla operations (Aragon, 2001).

The persistence of violence after Malino demonstrated that the peace agreement, although historically significant, did not fully address the structural conditions and institutional weaknesses that had enabled the conflict to escalate. Earlier reconciliation efforts by provincial and district governments had proven ineffective and were criticized as top-down, underfunded, and insufficiently connected to local stakeholders (Grindle, 1997). In this post-Malino context, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) emerged as a strategic instrument for rebuilding trust between security institutions and fragmented local communities through infrastructure rehabilitation, humanitarian assistance, and military civic action (Fisher et al., 2000). However, its implementation continued to face several obstacles, including weak interagency coordination, limited understanding of local sociocultural dynamics, and insufficient inclusion of civil society as an equal partner (Bakti, 2012).

Although the Malino Agreement is widely recognized for ending mass violence, the specific mechanisms through which CIMIC was implemented within Indonesia's Total People's Defense and Security System (Sishankamrata) during the Poso conflict remain insufficiently understood from a defense studies perspective. Sishankamrata, as codified in Law No. 3 of 2002 and the 2015 Defense White Paper, refers to a total defense system involving citizens, territories, and national resources in a comprehensive, integrated, and sustainable manner to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The doctrine emphasizes the

integration of military and nonmilitary components, the mobilization of national resources, and active societal participation—principles that conceptually align with CIMIC’s emphasis on civil-military collaboration and community engagement (Bara, 2025).

However, most existing research on Poso has adopted sociological, political, or humanitarian perspectives rather than examining civil-military operational interaction as its primary analytical focus. Recent scholarship has also highlighted a gap between Indonesia’s comprehensive defense doctrine and the institutional capacity required to implement it effectively, with cross-sectoral coordination remaining suboptimal and public understanding of defense issues still limited. This gap is significant because understanding how CIMIC operated within the total defense framework is essential for evaluating both the response to the Poso conflict and the broader applicability of Sishankamrata to internal security challenges.

The urgency of addressing this gap is heightened by Indonesia’s evolving security landscape. Internal conflicts rooted in ethnic, religious, and economic tensions continue to pose risks to national stability, while the integration of military and civilian components in conflict management remains a contested policy domain. The Poso experience offers important lessons for contemporary conflict prevention and peacebuilding, particularly as Indonesia continues to confront security challenges including terrorism, radicalization, and communal tensions in various regions. As the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) continue to refine their doctrine and operational approaches, empirical analysis of past CIMIC implementation can provide an evidence base for strengthening interagency coordination and community engagement mechanisms. The limited availability of rigorous defense-oriented analyses of CIMIC in Poso means that important operational lessons remain underexplored, thereby constraining the ability of security institutions to learn from past experience and adapt their approaches to comparable conflict settings.

This study introduces a novel analytical framework by integrating CIMIC, total defense doctrine, and conflict resolution within a single conceptual structure, thereby offering a defense-oriented contribution to a body of literature on Poso that has otherwise been dominated by sociological, political, and humanitarian perspectives. The novelty of the study lies in three dimensions. First, it examines CIMIC not as a generic concept of civil-military relations but as an operational mechanism embedded within Sishankamrata, thereby connecting tactical implementation with strategic doctrine. Second, it analyzes the functional differentiation of CIMIC across conflict phases—including security mobilization during escalation and communication, mediation, humanitarian assistance, and community engagement during stabilization—demonstrating that CIMIC functioned as an evolving rather than static mechanism. Third, it positions CIMIC as a bridge between security stabilization and peacebuilding by explaining how military operations created enabling conditions for dialogue, confidence-building, and reconciliation without claiming that CIMIC independently produced sustainable peace.

The purpose of this study is to examine how CIMIC was implemented within Indonesia’s Total People’s Defense and Security System during the 2000–2001 Poso communal conflict and how this implementation contributed to conflict resolution. Three interrelated research questions structure the analysis. First, what mechanisms and institutional roles shaped the implementation of CIMIC during the conflict, and how did these mechanisms evolve across different conflict phases? Second, to what extent did CIMIC implementation reflect the

principles of Sishankamrata—particularly the integration of military and nonmilitary components, the mobilization of national resources, and interagency collaboration—and what limitations constrained this implementation? Third, how did CIMIC contribute to conflict de-escalation, confidence-building, mediation support, and the success of the Malino Peace Agreement, and what was the nature and extent of this contribution?

The theoretical contribution of this study lies in its integration of Human Security Theory, Civil-Military Relations Theory, and Conflict Resolution Theory to explain why the provision of physical security alone does not automatically produce sustainable peace without accompanying processes of dialogue, recovery, and reconciliation. By analyzing CIMIC through these complementary theoretical perspectives, the study advances scholarly understanding of how military and civilian actors can collaborate effectively in complex internal conflict environments. Practically, the findings offer strategic insights for the TNI, the Ministry of Defense, the Indonesian National Police (Polri), regional governments, and other stakeholders regarding the strengthening of interagency coordination, clarification of institutional roles, and expansion of meaningful community participation in conflict management. The study may also inform more adaptive policies for conflict prevention, crisis management, and peacebuilding, thereby supporting a more integrated and participatory model of civil-military cooperation suited to Indonesia's pluralistic society

METHOD

Research Methodology and Design

This research employed a qualitative approach using a single-case study design following (Yin, 2018) to examine the dynamics of communal conflict management and peacebuilding in Poso, Central Sulawesi, during 2000–2001. Poso was selected because the conflict involved extensive interaction among military forces, government institutions, religious groups, and local communities and encompassed a transition from conflict escalation to the Malino I peace process (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).

The case study design was used to examine Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) within its operational and institutional context (Yin, 2018; Stake, 1995). The study sought to generate analytical rather than statistical generalizations by identifying contextually grounded mechanisms, institutional relationships, and challenges associated with civil-military cooperation in internal conflict settings. Data were collected through document analysis and interviews to support triangulation and enhance the credibility of the findings (Miles & Huberman, 2014).

Research Location and Time

The research was conducted in Jakarta and Poso, across multiple institutional and community-based settings to capture a comprehensive understanding of CIMIC implementation. Key sites included the Ministry of Defence (for strategic-level data on defense doctrine and the Total People's War Strategy), local government institutions (for field-level data on communal dynamics and post-conflict recovery), community-based organizations and civil society groups (for grassroots perspectives, including the local value of Sintuwu Maroso/collective solidarity), and the Indonesian National Defence Forces (TNI), given its pivotal role in conflict containment, security stabilization, and peace facilitation in Poso (Group, 2014).

The research was carried out over a nine-month period, from January to September 2026, covering proposal preparation, guidance, proposal seminar, data collection, thesis compilation, results seminar, thesis defense, revision, and submission.

Research Object

The research objects comprise three elements: first, Civil-Military Cooperation mechanisms implemented during the Poso conflict, including formal coordination structures, joint operational practices, and informal interaction patterns among military units, civilian authorities, and community actors (Chaisorn, 2022; Office, 2022); second, peace resolution outcomes, including reconciliation processes, security stabilization, and the restoration of social cohesion in post-conflict Poso (Lederach, 1997; Watch, 2002); and third, policy and strategic documents related to Indonesia's Total People's War Strategy, including the 1945 Constitution, Law No. 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense, the Indonesia Defence White Paper, and related military and interagency frameworks (Pamungkas & Yulianti E, 2024).

Research Subject

Research subjects consist of individuals with direct knowledge, professional experience, and institutional responsibility related to CIMIC implementation within the Poso conflict, selected through purposive sampling (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Patton, 2015) to capture military, governmental, academic, and practitioner perspectives (NATO, 2022; Chaisorn, 2022). The study initially identified six potential informants representing military, government, local government, community, religious, and academic perspectives; however, the final interview dataset consisted of five completed interviews (coded W1-W5), as one academic informant's interview was not concluded and was excluded from the analytical dataset. The list of informants is presented in Table 1. below.

Table 1. List of Research Informants

No.	Name	Position / Institution	Category	Time
1	Moh. Sirait Ardiansyah	Resourceperson, Pondok Pesantren Walisongo Poso	Religious / Community Leader	13 August 2026
2	Budiman Maliki	Founder of LPMS Poso	Religious / Community Leader	12 August 2026
3	Major General TNI (Retd) Peace and Conflict Resolution Lecturer, Dr. I Gede Sumertha KY, PSC, M.Sc	UNHAN	Conflict Resolution Academic / Expert	Not Concluded (excluded)
4	Markarma Lasimpala, SP., MP	KABAN Kesbangpol, Kab. Poso	Local Government Practitioner	13 August 2026
5	Letkol Mar Data, S.M, M.S.I., CRMP	Staff of Jakstrahan, Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia	Government / Defense Policy Practitioner	14 August 2026
6	Nike Pangat Widayanti, S.S., M.Si.	Staff of TNI Center of Military History (Pusjarah TNI) (Indonesia, 1945)	Military Practitioner	14 August 2026

Source: Primary data processed by the author. 2026.

Data Collection Techniques

This study employs two primary data collection techniques: document analysis and semi-structured interviews, whose integration facilitates methodological triangulation and strengthens the validity, credibility, and consistency of the findings (Miles et al., 2014).

1. Document Analysis

Involves the systematic examination of written, visual, and archival materials (Bowen, 2009), including the 1945 Constitution, Law No. 3 of 2002, defense policy

documents, military doctrines, official TNI and Ministry of Defense reports, local government documents, peace agreement records, academic publications, and reports from national and international organizations, in order to trace the historical development of the Poso conflict, CIMIC implementation, and the peacebuilding process leading to the Malino Peace Agreement.

2. Semi-Structured Interviews

Conducted with purposively selected informants representing TNI, the Ministry of Defence, Poso Regency Government, academic experts, and community/religious leaders, guided by an interview guide developed from the research questions and conceptual framework. Interviews were audio-recorded with informed consent and transcribed verbatim; where recording was not permitted, detailed field notes were prepared immediately afterward.

3. Methodological Triangulation

Evidence from document analysis and interviews was systematically compared to identify consistency, complementarity, or discrepancy, validating findings through multiple sources of evidence while reducing individual bias (Miles et al., 2014; Yin, 2018).

Data Analysis Techniques

This study employs the Interactive Model of Qualitative Data Analysis developed by Miles et al. (2014), which conceptualizes data analysis as a continuous, iterative process beginning during data collection and continuing until credible conclusions are established.

Prior to formal analysis, five interconnected data processing activities were undertaken: (1) data organization - arranging documentary materials and interview records by source and relevance; (2) data transcription - converting audio-recorded interviews into verbatim written form, each assigned an identification code (W1-W5); (3) data verification - checking the accuracy, completeness, and consistency of collected evidence against audio recordings, field notes, and source documentation; (4) data classification - grouping data into preliminary thematic categories such as Human Security, Civil-Military Relations, Civil-Military Cooperation, Conflict Resolution, and the Total People's War Strategy; and (5) data management - ensuring secure, ethical storage of research materials with participant identities anonymized through identification codes.

The organized dataset was then analyzed through four continuously interacting components of the Interactive Model: (1) data collection, treated as an integral part of ongoing analysis rather than merely an initial stage; (2) data condensation, involving the selection, coding, and simplification of qualitative data into categories derived from the conceptual framework; (3) data display, presenting condensed information through descriptive narratives, thematic matrices, comparison tables, and conceptual diagrams to support triangulation and pattern identification; and (4) conclusion drawing and verification, interpreting relationships among findings while continuously testing their validity through comparison of interview data, documentary evidence, and prior scholarly studies (Miles et al., 2014; Yin, 2018).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Overview of the Research Object

Poso is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious district in Central Sulawesi whose social fabric was severely disrupted by communal violence between 1998 and 2001. The conflict escalated

through several waves of violence rooted in a complex mix of demographic change, economic competition, political rivalry following decentralization, and religious identity polarization, which transformed localized incidents into large-scale communal warfare (Hanifah & Mulansari, 2022). In response, the state progressively expanded its security presence - TNI and Polri personnel increased from 1,321 in 2000 to 2,024 in 2001 - and conducted Operations Sintuwu Maroso I, II, and III, while the conflict gradually evolved from open communal warfare into a more complex security threat involving displacement, humanitarian needs, and, later, terrorism-linked violence (Huntington, 1957).

As violence began to de-escalate, civilian protection, humanitarian assistance, and community participation became increasingly central, culminating in the Malino I Peace Agreement (2001), a ten-point declaration addressing the cessation of violence, law enforcement, mutual respect, rights restoration, refugee return, and rehabilitation. This trajectory - from escalation, through security stabilization, to negotiated peace - establishes Poso as an analytically rich single case for examining how Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) was implemented, how it reflected Indonesia's Total People's War Strategy (Sishankamrata), and how it contributed to peace resolution (Committee, 2008).

Research Findings

Findings were developed through a qualitative coding procedure combining documentary evidence with five completed research interviews (W1-W5). The analytical process moved from Open Coding (identifying concepts directly from the data) to Axial Coding (grouping related concepts into broader categories) to Selective Coding (condensing axial categories into central findings addressing the study's three research questions), with cross-source comparison and triangulation applied throughout to strengthen credibility.

Open Coding

Ten open codes were identified from the documentary and interview data, summarized in Table 2. below.

Table 2. Open Coding

Code	Open Code	Operational Definition
OC1	Interagency Coordination	Coordination among TNI, Polri, government, and civilian institutions in managing the conflict
OC2	Institutional Role & Friction	Distribution of roles and authorities, including overlapping authority and role ambiguity
OC3	Operational Communication & Information	Information exchange, communication networks, and situational awareness among actors
OC4	Security Mobilization & Operations	Personnel mobilization, security operations, and territorial security stabilization
OC5	Community Engagement & Participation	Involvement of local communities, religious and traditional leaders in conflict management
OC6	Local Protection & Mutual Support	Community protection, support for security personnel, and security-community relations
OC7	Humanitarian & Recovery Support	Humanitarian assistance, support for displaced persons, and post-conflict recovery
OC8	Dialogue & Mediation	Intergroup dialogue, mediation, and non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms
OC9	De-escalation & Confidence Building	Reduction of violence, ceasefire efforts, and prevention of renewed escalation
OC10	Reconciliation & Social Cohesion	Reconciliation, forgiveness, and development of post-conflict social cohesion

Source: Primary data processed by the author. 2026.

Axial and Selective Coding

The ten open codes were subsequently grouped into five axial categories: (AC1) Institutional Coordination and Role Integration; (AC2) Integrated Security and Civilian Protection; (AC3) Community-Centered Support and Participation; (AC4) Dialogue, Mediation and Confidence Building; and (AC5) Reconciliation, Recovery and Social Stabilization. A theoretical check against Human Security Theory, Civil-Military Relations Theory, and Conflict Resolution Theory confirmed that these patterns were broadly consistent with the study's conceptual framework, although integration was found not to be fully institutionalized.

The five axial categories were then condensed into three selective codes, each directly addressing one research question, as presented in Table 3. below.

Table 3. Selective Coding — Key Research Findings

Code	Selective Coding Category	Definition	RQ
SC1	Integrated but Functionally Differentiated CIMIC	Military, government, and civilian actors performed differentiated but interconnected functions through coordination, security operations, communication, and civilian engagement; the mechanism was not fully institutionalized.	RQ1
SC2	Integrative but Incomplete Reflection of Sishankamrata	CIMIC reflected the integrative principles of Sishankamrata (multi-actor mobilization, territorial engagement) but remained constrained by limited institutionalization, grassroots participation, and interinstitutional coordination.	RQ2
SC3	CIMIC as a Bridge toward Peace Resolution	CIMIC mechanisms enabled the transition from security stabilization toward dialogue, reconciliation, recovery, and peacebuilding, functioning as an enabling and connecting mechanism rather than the sole cause of peace.	RQ3

Source: Primary data processed by the author, 2026.

Discussion

Implementation of Civil-Military Cooperation

The evidence shows that CIMIC during the Poso conflict cannot be reduced to a simple relationship between military forces and civilians, but developed through interagency coordination, differentiated institutional roles, security operations, information exchange, and civilian engagement. TNI and Polri operated jointly under a unified command structure (Kartomo & Runturambi, 2020), while the central government functioned as facilitator and mediator rather than sole decision-maker (Alganih, 2016). Interview evidence (W1) confirmed that coordination aimed to produce shared understanding, clear division of responsibilities, and unity of effort. However, coordination did not automatically mean CIMIC was fully institutionalized: W2, a community peacebuilding practitioner, cautioned that overlapping interests between government and communities did not necessarily constitute a mature cooperative mechanism.

A key finding is that CIMIC's functional emphasis shifted across the conflict's phases - security mobilization dominated during the peak of violence, while communication, mediation, humanitarian assistance, and community engagement became more prominent as the situation stabilized (W3, W5). This distinction between the security phase and the peacebuilding phase is identified as one of the study's most important findings, answering RQ1 by demonstrating

that CIMIC was implemented through an evolving, functionally differentiated interinstitutional mechanism rather than a static, uniform program.

Relationship with Sishankamrata

The Poso experience reflected several principles of Indonesia's Total People's War Strategy (Sishankamrata), particularly the integration of national resources (the increase of TNI-Polri personnel and Operations Sintuwu Maroso I-III), multi-actor involvement beyond security forces (government, religious organizations, and community representatives in the Malino I process), and territorial engagement through local information networks (Cinu, 2016). However, three limitations qualify this integrative character: institutional integration was not consistently formalized (W2); grassroots participation remained limited and predominantly elite-oriented (Yakobus et al., 2019, 2023); and security institutions were not uniformly perceived as neutral or fully trusted by communities (Cinu, 2016). Accordingly, the second finding characterizes the Poso response as an integrative but incomplete reflection of Sishankamrata, indicating that the quality of integration, clarity of roles, institutional legitimacy, and depth of community participation matter as much as the number of institutions formally involved.

Contribution to Peace Resolution

CIMIC is found to have contributed to peace not by producing it directly, but by creating and sustaining conditions in which peacebuilding mechanisms could operate, through four interconnected mechanisms. First, de-escalation: the Malino process substantially reduced large-scale communal violence, though smaller-scale violence (including terrorism-linked incidents) persisted afterward (Aditjondro, 2004), indicating that de-escalation and complete peace resolution are analytically distinct outcomes. Second, humanitarian assistance and recovery: the central government provided approximately Rp33.5 billion in assistance, benefiting 12,746 refugee families and funding 5,813 refugee houses (Alganih, 2016), reflecting an expansion from physical protection toward restoration of normal community life. Third, dialogue and mediation: the Malino I meeting (75 participants) produced a ten-point agreement with the government acting as facilitator rather than imposing a unilateral settlement. Fourth, reconciliation and social cohesion: religious and community leaders - illustrated by W3's experience rebuilding Pondok Pesantren Walisongo - played a distinct legitimizing role in rebuilding trust that security institutions alone could not provide (Sulhan & Januri, 2022).

Overall, the third finding positions CIMIC as a bridge between security stabilization and broader peacebuilding rather than a standalone peace mechanism - a conclusion consistent with Human Security Theory, Civil-Military Relations Theory, and Conflict Resolution Theory, which together explain why physical security deployment alone does not automatically produce sustainable peace without accompanying dialogue, recovery, and reconciliation processes.

CONCLUSION

This study examined the implementation of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) within Indonesia's Total People's Defense and Security System (Sishankamrata) during the 2000–2001 Poso communal conflict and its contribution to conflict resolution. Based on the coding and triangulation of documentary and interview data, the study identified three principal findings corresponding to the research questions. Collectively, these findings showed that CIMIC in Poso was not a single operational mechanism but an evolving process that connected

security institutions, government authorities, religious and community leaders, and conflict-affected communities.

CIMIC was implemented as an integrated but functionally differentiated interinstitutional mechanism involving coordination among the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), the Indonesian National Police (Polri), central and local governments, religious and community leaders, and civil society. During the escalation of violence, its dominant function was security stabilization; as violence decreased, cooperation increasingly expanded to include communication, humanitarian assistance, community engagement, mediation, and recovery. However, CIMIC during this period was not yet fully institutionalized. Interaction between military and civilian actors was strongly shaped by the emergency context, making cooperation more situational and functional than institutionally established. The Poso experience therefore represented an integrative but incomplete manifestation of *Sishankamrata*. The involvement of the TNI, Polri, government institutions, religious and community leaders, and wider society reflected the mobilization of multiple national resources and territorial structures in response to an internal security threat. Nevertheless, this integration was not always accompanied by institutionalized coordination, clearly defined roles, or equitable participation. Community involvement was often mediated through local elites rather than broad grassroots participation, while institutional friction and limited trust reduced the effectiveness of cooperation. *Sishankamrata* was therefore reflected more strongly as an operational principle of integration than as a fully institutionalized whole-of-society mechanism, indicating that its effective implementation required coordination, legitimacy, role clarity, information sharing, and meaningful community participation rather than merely the simultaneous involvement of military and civilian actors.

CIMIC functioned as a bridge between security stabilization and conflict resolution. Military and security operations reduced large-scale communal violence and created minimum security conditions that enabled government functions, humanitarian assistance, dialogue, and mediation to proceed, ultimately contributing to the Malino Peace Agreement. However, CIMIC did not independently produce sustainable peace. The continuation of smaller-scale violence after the agreement demonstrated that ending mass violence was distinct from resolving the underlying conflict, as grievances, trauma, distrust, and social fragmentation persisted and required continued civilian engagement, reconciliation, and confidence-building. CIMIC's contribution to conflict resolution was therefore best understood as enabling, facilitating, and connecting rather than as an independent causal intervention, because the achievement of peace also depended on political mediation, religious and community leadership, and broader changes in the conflict environment (Burton, 1990).

These conclusions should be interpreted as analytical lessons from the Poso case rather than as general causal propositions applicable to all communal conflicts, because the contribution of CIMIC could not be isolated from the broader peace process with which it interacted. The central conclusion of this study was that CIMIC could contribute significantly to conflict resolution when it operated as an integrated mechanism linking military security functions with civilian governance and community-based peacebuilding. Its effectiveness depended not only on military institutional capacity but also on the ability to establish effective coordination, build public trust, ensure meaningful community participation, and transform security stabilization into a broader peacebuilding process. The Poso experience also provided

an important lesson for the implementation of Sishankamrata: the integration of national defense resources should ultimately be directed toward protecting society and restoring sustainable social stability rather than being limited to the suppression of violence.

REFERENCES

- Aditjondro, G. J. (2004). *Kerusuhan Poso dan Morowali: Akar permasalahan dan jalan keluarnya*. Yayasan Tanah Merdeka.
- Alganih, I. (2016). Konflik Poso: Kajian historis tahun 1998–2001. *Criksetra: Jurnal Pendidikan Sejarah*, 5(10), 166–174.
- Aragon, L. V. (2001). Communal violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi: Where people eat, what people wear, and how people fight. *Indonesia*, 72, 45–79.
- Bakti, I. N. (2012). *Kaji ulang penanganan konflik di Indonesia: Penanganan konflik Poso*. P2P LIPI & Pustaka Pelajar.
- Bank/UNSFIR, W. (2004). *Dataset on violent local conflicts in Indonesia*. World Bank Working Paper Series.
- Bara, A. L. (2025). Book review: Women, conflict, and peace: Narratives of women victims and survivors in Poso, Ambon, and Atambua by Mery Kolimon et al. *Indonesian Journal of Theology*, 13(1), 135–138. <https://doi.org/10.46567/ijt.v13i1.323>
- Bertrand, J. (2004). *Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. *Qualitative Research Journal*, 9(2), 27–40. <https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027>
- Burton, J. (1990). *Conflict: Resolution and prevention*. St. Martin's Press.
- Center, H. (2010). *Dinamika perdamaian pasca-Deklarasi Malino di Poso*. The Habibie Center.
- Chaisorn, P. (2022). Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR): The legal frameworks. *Brawijaya Law Journal*, 9(1), 16–32. <https://doi.org/10.21776/ub.blj.2022.009.01.02>
- Cinu, S. (2016). Agama, militerisasi dan konflik: Kasus Poso, Sulawesi Tengah. *Al-Fikra: Jurnal Ilmiah Keislaman*, 15(1), 1–49. <https://doi.org/10.24014/af.v15i1.4007>
- Committee, I.-A. S. (2008). *Civil-military guidelines and reference for complex emergencies*. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
- Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2018). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches* (5th ed., Ed.). Sage Publications.
- Diprose, R. (2009). Physical and social fragmentation in Indonesia: A case study of position and power in Poso. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 5(1), 100–115.
- Fisher, S., Abdi, D. I., Ludin, J., Smith, R., & Williams, S. (2000). *Working with conflict: Skills and strategies for action*. Zed Books.
- Grindle, M. S. (1997). *Getting good government: Capacity building in the public sectors of developing countries*. Harvard Institute for International Development.
- Group, G. of I. & W. B. (2014). *Sistem Nasional Pemantauan Kekerasan (National Violence Monitoring System) 2014*. <https://doi.org/10.48529/myt5-0951>
- Hanifah, I., & Mulansari, C. (2022). Instruksi Presiden sebagai hasil dari upaya mediasi konflik di konflik Poso. *SUARGA: Studi Keberagamaan Dan Keberagaman*, 1(2), 68–76. <https://doi.org/10.24090/suarga.v1i2.7450>
- Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil–military relations*. Harvard University Press.
- Indonesia, R. of. (1945). *The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia*.

- Kartomo, A., & Runturambi, A. J. S. (2020). Model penanggulangan terorisme di Indonesia: Studi kasus efektifitas sinergitas militer dan kepolisian di Poso tahun 2016. *Jurnal Kajian Strategik Ketahanan Nasional*, 3(1), 19–29. <https://doi.org/10.7454/jkskn.v3i1.10031>
- Lederach, J. P. (1997). *Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*. United States Institute of Peace Press.
- McRae, D. (2013). *A few poorly organized men: Interreligious violence in Poso, Indonesia*. Brill Nijhoff.
- Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (2014). *Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook* (3rd ed., Ed.). SAGE Publications.
- Office, N. S. (2022). *Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.19: Allied joint doctrine for Civil–Military Cooperation*. NATO Standardization Office.
- Pamungkas & Yulianti E, W. S. (2024). *Analysis of Employee Communication Ethics on The Performance of The Personnel Bureau of The General Secretary of The Ministry of Defense of The Republic of Indonesia*.
- Van Klinken, G. (2007). *Communal violence and democratization in Indonesia: Small town wars*. Routledge.
- Watch, H. R. (2002). *Violence and displacement in Poso, Central Sulawesi*. Human Rights Watch.
- Yakobus, I. K., Abidjulu, R. Z. W., Tobondo, Y. A., & Guampe, F. A. (2023). Analisis penanganan teroris kelompok Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) pasca konflik di Kabupaten Poso. *Jurnal Sosialisasi: Jurnal Hasil Pemikiran, Penelitian Dan Pengembangan Keilmuan Sosiologi Pendidikan*, 10(1), 79–87. <https://doi.org/10.26858/sosialisasi.v1i1.43252>
- Yakobus, I. K., Yahya, M., & Agustang, A. D. M. P. (2019). Revitalisasi nilai budaya Sintuwu Maroso sebagai alternative resolusi pasca konflik di Kabupaten Poso. *Jurnal Sosio Sains*, 5(1), 14–21.
- Yin, R. K. (2018). *Case study research and applications: Design and methods (6th ed.)*. Sage Publications.